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We present the first protocol for oblivious transfer that can be implemented with an optical continuous-
variable system, and prove its security in the noisy-storage model. This model allows security to be achieved
by sending more quantum signals than an attacker can reliably store at one specific point during the protocol.
Concretely, we determine how many signals need to be sent in order to achieve security by establishing a trade-
off between quantum uncertainty generated in the protocol and the classical capacity of the memory channel. As
our main technical tool, we study and derive new uncertainty relations for continuous-variable systems. Finally,
we provide explicit security parameters for realistic memory models.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) offers security that rests
only on the laws of quantum mechanics [1–3]. Yet, there
are still important cryptographic protocols which cannot be
realized without additional assumptions, even using quan-
tum communication [4–10]. Examples of such protocols are
oblivious-transfer (OT), bit commitment (BC), and secure
password-based identification, where two distrustful parties
(Alice and Bob) engage in a protocol and want to be ensured
that the other party cannot cheat, or maliciously influence the
outcome.
Due to the great practical importance of problems such as
secure identification one is willing to rely on assumptions in
order to achieve security. Classically, these are usually com-
putational assumptions that are not fully future proof and can
possibly be broken retroactively using a quantum computer.
Another line of research pursues physical assumptions on the
adversary, such as imposing limits on his abilities to store in-
formation [11, 12]. This assumption is especially appealing in
quantum communication where advanced technologies such
as long-lived quantum memories are very challenging and ex-
pensive. Moreover, as opposed to computational assumptions,
it provides the benefit that they are indeed fully future proof:
even if the adversary obtains a much larger quantum memory
after the protocol, security cannot be broken retroactively.
Given any constraint on the adversary’s storage device, se-
curity can always be obtained by sending sufficiently many
signals during the course of the protocol. Generalizing
the model of classical bounded storage [11], the so-called
bounded-quantum-storage model assumes that the adversary
can only store a certain number of qubits [13, 14]. More gen-
erally, the noisy-storage model [15] ensures security for ar-
bitrary noisy memory devices. Specifically, a link has been
made between security and the classical capacity [16], entan-
glement cost [17], and quantum capacity [18, 19] of the ad-
versary’s quantum storage device. An important feature of the
corresponding protocols is that they do not require the hon-
est protocol participants to have any quantum memory at all.
In particular, they can be implemented using BB84 or six-
state QKD protocols, which have been experimentally demon-
strated [20, 21].
Yet, all protocols proposed so far [13, 15–17, 20, 22, 23] are
based on discrete-variable systems requiring single-photon
detectors that are, despite recent improvements, still chal-
lenging technologies [24]. Here, we propose the first pro-
tocols based on optical continuous-variable systems, where
the information is encoded in the X and P quadrature of
the electromagnetic field (see, e.g., [25]). Optical continu-
ous variable implementations provide practical benefits since
transmission, measurements (homodyne detection) and some-
times also preparations require only standard telecommuni-
cation technologies. These benefits allow easy integration of
the protocols into current classical networks. Moreover, state
preparation and homodyne detection are highly efficient and
robust technologies permitting high clock rates, and they are
available as on-chip components [26].
We present a protocol for OT as well as BC, and derive
sufficient conditions for security in the noisy-storage model
depending on the classical capacity of the malicious party’s
memory channel similar to [16]. For instance, we show that
security can be obtained if twice the classical capacity is lower
than the uncertainty that is generated by X and P measure-
ments plus the error-correction (EC) amount that is required
to overcome the information loss during transmission. The
latter term is crucial for CV protocols since, compared to dis-
crete variable protocols, CV protocols require the exchange of
a significant amount of EC information.
The main technical ingredients in our security proof are
novel entropic uncertainty relations. While we derive an un-
certainty relation that holds without assumptions by using ma-
jorization techniques from [27], it turns out that even though
security is in principle possible it is not sufficient to obtain
a good trade-off in parameters. We overcome this technical
problem by showing uncertainty relations under reasonable
assumptions, namely, that the adversary’s encoding is Gaus-
sian or independent and identical over only a limited number
of modes. The security trade-off is then analyzed in both cases
for a memory channel modeled by a lossy and noisy bosonic
Gaussian channel. Our work opens the door for the devel-
opment of continuous-variable protocols in the noisy-storage
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II. OBLIVIOUS TRANSFER IN THE NOISY-STORAGE
MODEL
We first focus on OT along which we discuss the essen-
tial ideas behind the security in the noisy-storage model. A
protocol for OT is especially appealing since any two-party
cryptographic problem in which Alice and Bob do not trust
each other can in principle be solved using OT as a building
block [28]. While the quantum part of the protocols for OT
and BC protocol are similar, the classical post-processing is
different. We consider a randomized version of OT, where
Alice has no input and gets as output two bit strings s0, s1
and Bob has input t and obtains a bit string s˜. If both are
honest, we require that s˜ = st (correctness). If Alice is hon-
est, we require that Bob can only know one of the strings. If
Bob is honest, we demand that Alice does not learn t. No
requirements are made if both are dishonest. These security
requirements are made precise in a composable fashion in B 1
by demanding that it is indistinguishable from a perfectly cor-
rect protocol with probability C , and from a perfectly secure
protocol for honest Alice and Bob with A, B .
The quantum part of the protocol for CV is based on a
QKD protocol using Gaussian modulated squeezed states.
As it is conceptually simpler, we consider an entanglement
based version of the protocol, although its prepare and mea-
sure version is straightforward. The source is given by the
CV equivalent of a maximally entangled state, namely, a
two-mode squeezed state simply referred to as EPR (Ein-
stein,Podolski,Rosen [29]) state in the following (see Ap-
pendix D). The measurements are homodyne detections with
a discretized outcome range into binnings of length δ. Mathe-
matically, they are modeled as coarse-grained X and P mea-
surements and in the following denoted by Xδ and Pδ (see,
e.g., [30]). The measurement choice of Alice (Bob) in round i
are denoted by θiA (θ
i
B), where θ
i
A = 0, 1 stands for perform-
ing Xδ, Pδ . The quantum protocol is then simply:
(Q1) Alice creates n EPR pairs of which she sends each half
to Bob.
(Q2) Alice and Bob measure independently Xδ (θ = 0) or
Pδ (θ = 1) according to θA = θ1A . . . θ
n
A and θB =
θ1B . . . θ
n
B , where θA and θB are chosen uniformly ran-
dom in {0, 1}n [31]. The strings of outcomes for Alice
and Bob are denoted by Z and Y .
(Q3) They wait for a fixed time ∆t.
The crucial property of this protocol is that approximately half
of the strings Z and Y are strongly correlated. However, nei-
ther party knows which part. This concept has been formal-
ized in [16] under the name of weak string erasure.
The classical part of the protocol proceeds as follows:
(OT1) Alice sends Bob her basis choice θA. Bob defines the
set It = {i | θiA = θiB} and its complement I1−t ac-
cording to his choice bit t. He sends I0, I1 to Alice.
…
EPR Pairs 
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FIG. 1. The scenario of a dishonest Bob. The memory attack is
modeled by an encoding E that maps (conditioned on some classical
outcome K) the n modes to the memory input Qin. The memory M
is modeled by νn uses of the channel F . We consider the situations
where the encoding E is arbitrary, a mixture of Gaussian channels or
independent and identical over a small numbers of signals m.
(OT2) Alice forms the strings Zk = (Zi)i∈Ik for k = 0, 1, and
computes error-correction informationW0,W1 individ-
ually for Z0, Z1 and sends it to Bob. Bob then corrects
the string corresponding to his choice Yt = (Y i)i∈It
using Wt to obtain Y ′t . [32]
(OT3) Alice selects random 2-universal hash functions f0, f1
from X0 and X1 to `-bit strings and outputs sk =
fk(Xk), k = 0, 1. She then sends f0, f1 to Bob who
outputs s˜ = ft(Y ′t ).
We further assume that if a honest party obtains a value from
the other party that is not conformal with the protocol, it gen-
erates a random output. This ensures that the protocol always
terminates with an output.
It is easy to verify that executing the above classical proto-
col after (Q1)-(Q3) satisfies the correctness condition for OT
with C that depends on the error-correction protocol. More-
over, security for honest Bob simply follows since the only
information leaving his lab are the sets I0, I1, which are un-
correlated with t. For a more rigorous proof of composable
security, we refer to [14].
More interesting is the security for honest Alice. In fact, if
Bob has a quantum memory that allows him to faithfully store
all the modes sent by Alice over a time longer than ∆t, he can
cheat perfectly. He only has to wait to receive Alice’s basis
choice θA and measure all modes in the corresponding basis.
But if Bob has only noisy quantum storage he might not have
enough information to obtain both strings s0 and s1. As illus-
trated in Fig. 1, we model Bob’s memory attack by an encod-
ing operation E that maps the n modes to the input space Qin
of his quantum memory correlated to classical informationK.
After that Bob stores Qin in his quantum memory for time ∆t
until he receives θA. We model the corresponding memory
channel M of νn quantum channels F , i.e., M = F⊗νn.
Bob’s information at the end of the protocol is denoted by B′
and given by all the classical information obtained from Alice
plus K andM(Qin).
Our goal is to quantify the relation between the capacity of
Bob’s quantum memory and the security for Alice. The latter
is obtained if one of the strings, let’s say s0 for simplicity, is
uniformly random and uncorrelated with B′. Fortunately, a
standard method known in cryptography as privacy amplifi-
3cation can be used to ensure the desired property even if the
adversary still holds significant amount of information about
Z0: if the length ` of the hashed string s0 is roughly equal to
the conditional smooth min-entropy H1min(Z0|B′) of the in-
put of the hash function Z0 given Bob’s information B′, i.e.,
` = H1min(Z0|B′) − 2 log 1/(A − 41) [33], then s0 is A-
close in trace distance to uniform and uncorrelated from B′.
For 1 = 0, the smooth min-entropy is equal to the negative
logarithm of the success probability that Bob can guess Z0
by measuring B′, and its generalization for  ≥ 0 is obtained
by maximizing it over all states that are -close [33, 34] (see
Appendix A 1 for details).
We thus have to lower bound H1min(Z0|B′), for which we
follow ideas developed for the discrete variable case [16, 23].
First we use an inequality from [16] to bound Hmin(Z0|B′)
by means of the classical capacity of Bob’s memory chan-
nel. Note that Bob’s information B′ at the end of the pro-
tocol is given by B′ = M(Qin)Bcl with classical informa-
tion Bcl = KθAW0W1. Then, if we denote by PMsucc(k) the
optimal success probability to reliably send k classical bits
throughM, we have that [16]
2−H
1
min(Z0|B′) ≤ PMsucc(bH2min(Z0|Bcl)− log 1/(1 − 2)2c) .
(1)
This inequality reduces the problem to bounding the smooth
min-entropy conditioned on Bob’s classical information only.
An additional problem arises because we do not know
which of the two strings Z0, Z1 Bob does not learn. This
problem can be solved by using the min-entropy splitting the-
orem [35], which says that if the uncertainty about the whole
string is high, i.e. H2min(Z|Bcl) ≥ λ, then so it is in average
for the sub-strings Z0 and Z1. More precisely, there exists a
random variable D such that H2min(ZD|BclD) ≥ λ/2 − 1.
Note that this result relies crucially on the fact that the infor-
mation upon which one conditions, i.e., BclD is classical and
not quantum [36]. Finally, we can remove the dependence on
the error-correction information W0,W1 by simply subtract-
ing the maximal information contained in W0,W1, i.e., the
number of bits `EC = log |W0W1|.
In conclusion, we obtain security for Alice if ` =
−1/2 logPMsucc(nrOT)− log 1/(A − 41) where
rOT = 1/2
(
λ2(n)− `EC
n
)
− 1
n
(
2 log
1
(1 − 2) − 1
)
,
(2)
and A > 41 > 2 ≥ 0. Here, λ(n) stands for a lower bound
on the smooth min-entropy rate
1
n
Hmin(Z|θAK) ≥ λ(n) . (3)
We can now relate Alice’s security to the classical ca-
pacity Ccl(F) of F whenever the success probability of
reliably sending classical information through F at a rate
R higher than Ccl(F) decays exponentially PF⊗nsucc (nR) ≤
2−nξ(R−Ccl(F)) [37] (see Discussion for examples). Then, by
a simple calculation we find that security for Bob can be ob-
tained for large enough n if the condition
rOT(n)− νCcl(F) > 0 (4)
is satisfied. Moreover, the length of s0, s1 can be chosen as
` = nξ(rOT(n)− Ccl(F))−O(log 1/A).
In order to analyse the security we have to find tight lower
bounds λ(n) for the inequality (3), which is a special kind
of uncertainty relation. The other important quantity is the
EC rate which in practice is directly determined by the proto-
col. For the following discussions we use the standard formula
`EC/n = H(X
A
δ ) − βI(XAδ : XBδ ), where XAδ and XBδ are
the random variables induced if both players are measuring
Xδ . The parameter β ≤ 1 is called the efficiency of the EC
protocol and values of about 0.96 are practical using currently
available codes [38–40].
III. BIT COMMITMENT IN THE NOISY STORAGE
MODEL
A bit commitment protocol consists of a commitment phase
where Bob commits to a bit c, and an open phase where Al-
ice learns c. Honest Alice wants to be ensured that Bob can-
not change his commitment c after completion of the com-
mitment phase (binding). And Bob wants that Alice cannot
learn c before the open phase (hiding). Similarly to the OT
protocol, we use composable security definitions (described
in Appendix C 1) using security parameters C , H , B for the
correctness, hiding and binding conditions.
The protocol for commitment is similar to the quantum part
of OT and consists of steps (Q1)-(Q3) except that in (Q2) Bob
is measuring all his signals in the basis corresponding to the
bit c he wants to commit to θB = c, . . . , c. The open phase is
purely classical [13]:
(BC1) Bob sends c and Y to Alice who defines the substring
ZI , YI of Z, Y containing the elements I = {i|θiA =
c}. She then accepts if YI ∈ BC (ZI) and rejects oth-
erwise.
Here, the set B(ZI) is the -typical set of outcomes for Bob
if both measure in the same basis and Alice obtains outcome
ZI . If n is large enough, Alice will accept with probability
C due to the property of typical sequences. Moreover, the
hiding condition is satisfied perfectly since Bob does not send
any information in the commitment phase.
As in OT, it is evident that Bob can cheat perfectly if he
has a perfect quantum memory. But under the same assump-
tions on Bob’s memory as discussed for the OT protocol, we
show in Appendix C 2 that the hiding condition is satisfied for
sufficiently large n if
1/2(ξλ(n)− log VC/n)− νCcl(F) > 0 , (5)
where VC = maxY |B−1C (Y )| with B−1ε (Y ) = {Z |Y ∈
Bε(Z)} the set of Alice’s outcomes Z for which Y would
be accepted. Note that in our case, |B−1 (Y )| is independent
of Y and the maximization can be omitted. In particular, if
the transmissivity of the channel between Alice and Bob is τ ,
one finds that log V = nH(XB√τδ|XAδ ), which is approxi-
mately the reverse reconciliation rate H(Yδ|Zδ) increased by
log 1/
√
τ (see Appendix C 2 for details).
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FIG. 2. One can achieve security in the noisy storage model without
assumptions if the error-correction rate `/n (short dashed) is below
the entropy rate λMaj (straight), under Gaussian encoding assump-
tion if `/n is below λGauss (long dashed), and under independent
and identical encodings over m = 25 signals if `/n is below λIID
(dashed-dotted). The horizontal axis describes the coarse graining δ
of the homodyne detection of the X and P quadrature. We chose
practical protocol parameters of n = 108 signals and security pa-
rameters A = B = 10−9. The error-correction rate is plotted for
an efficiency of β = 0.96 and correlations obtained by an EPR state
with squeezing of 10.8dB and one-sided losses of 5%. We further
emphasize that the situation looks similar for the BC protocol for the
considered parameters.
IV. CV UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS FOR THE NOISY
STORAGE MODEL
Both the security of OT and BC rely on tight bounds λ
in (3). To obtain such bounds using (1) we first need an un-
certainty relation. In order to derive it, let us grant additional
power to a dishonest Bob who can prepare an ensemble of
states {ρk}k according to K himself and send it to Alice who
performs on any mode randomly Xδ or Pδ . After complet-
ing all measurements, Alice sends her basis choice θA to Bob
who has to guess the outcomes Z of the measurements. As
Bob does not know the measurement choice prior to prepa-
ration, the uncertainty principle forbids Bob to know Z per-
fectly, i.e., there is no state for which the outcomes of both X
and P are certain. As the uncertainty principle holds indepen-
dently for any state of the ensemble, it is intuitively clear that
K cannot bring any advantage, which is why we omit it in the
following (see e.g. [41] for details).
Traditionally, the uncertainty principle for X and P is cap-
tured as a lower bound on the product of their standard de-
viations σXσP ≥ ~/2 [42]. Here, we are interested in an
entropic version for coarse grained measurements. For the
sake of illustration, let us first consider the equivalent re-
lation for the well-known Shannon entropy, i.e., H(X) =
−∑x px log px if X is distributed according to {px}. For
n = 1, the conditional Shannon entropy of interest is given
by H(Z|θA) = 1/2(H(Xδ) + H(Pδ)), where H(Xδ) de-
notes the Shannon entropy of the outcomes of the Xδ mea-
surement and similar for Pδ . However, it is known that
H(Xδ) + H(Pδ) ≥ − log c(δ) with c(δ) = δ2/(pie~) [43],
and thus, H(Z|θA) ≥ −1/2 log c(δ). This inequality can
straightforwardly be generalized to n ≥ 1.
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FIG. 3. The left side of the plots correspond to secure regions for
the OT protocol under Gaussian encoding assumption (λGauss), de-
pending on the transmissivity η (horizontal axis) and the additive
noise variance N (vertical axis) of malicious Bob’s Gaussian mem-
ory channel. The thermal noise of the memory is set to Nth = 0
and the maximal photon constraint to Nmax = 30. The different
curves correspond to different numbers of quantum memories νn,
squeezing strengths s and one-sided transmissivity τ of the EPR state
for values (ν, s, τ) = (1/8, 10.8, 0.95) (solid), (1/10, 10.8, 0.90)
(dashed) and (1/12, 7.8, 0.9) (dashed-dotted). We further set the
coarse graining to δ = 0.2 (largest optimal value) and choose the
other parameters as in Fig. 2.
Let us now turn to the uncertainty relation of interest in (3)
expressed by the smooth min-entropy instead of the von Neu-
mann entropy. Such uncertainty relations have previously
been analysed for maximally complementary qubit measure-
ments [14, 41]. Here, we analyze this uncertainty relation for
the first time for X and P measurements. In strong con-
trast to the situation of the Shannon entropy discussed be-
fore, a non-trivial relation is only possible for coarse-grained
X and P measurement but not for continuous ones (see Ap-
pendix A 2 a). Hence, the lower bound has to be derived for
Xδ and Pδ directly, which makes it very challenging.
We derive three different uncertainty bounds denoted by
λMaj, λ

Gauss and λ

IID. The first λ

Maj is valid without re-
strictions on the states ρk. The derivation is based on a re-
sult by Landau and Pollak [44] that for any two fixed in-
tervals I, J ∈ R, the probability q[I] to measure X in I ,
and p[J ] to measure P in J have to satisfy the constraint
cos−1
√
q[I] + cos−1
√
p[J ] ≥ cos−1 γ where γ is a function
of the length of the intervals of I and J . This relation yields an
infinite number of constraints for the probability distributions
forXδ and Pδ . However, it is difficult to derive a lower bound
by including all constraints. The bound λMaj is obtained by a
relaxation using the majorization technique from [27] and can
be computed recursively (see Appendix A 2 b for details). The
drawback is that the relaxation is not optimal leading to a lose
bound leaving the problem open to find a tighter relaxation.
This problem is overcome in the other two bounds at the
expense of additional assumptions. The bound λGauss holds
under the assumption that the state is a mixture of Gaussian
states. Applied to the noisy-storage model, this assumption
requires that the encoding operation E (not the quantum mem-
ory F) has to be a mixture of Gaussian operations, which can
be justified since non-Gaussian operations are still very chal-
5lenging in practice and more importantly, their implementa-
tions are generally not deterministic. The explicit form is
λGauss(n) = sup(B
α
Gauss(δ)− 1/(n(α− 1)) log 2/2), where
BαGauss(δ) =
1
1− α log
1
2
(1 + (1/α)
(
δ2/(pi~)
)(α−1)
) (6)
and the optimization is over all α > 1. The bound is de-
rived using continuous approximations and the details are in
Appendix A 2 c.
The last bound λIID applies under the assumption that the
ensemble states are independent and identical over only m-
mode states (m  n). This assumption requires that Bob’s
encoding operation E acts in an identical and independent way
on onlymmodes, which in the language of QKD corresponds
to collective attacks. It is a reasonable assumption since co-
herent operations of all the n modes may require a lot of re-
sources. Moreover, if Bob wants to coherently act on all n
modes he has to store all the incoming modes until all nmodes
arrived, which in principle already requires a short-time mem-
ory. It might also be possible for Alice to send the modes with
delays in order to enhance her security. The bound is derived
via a reduction of the smooth min-entropy for independent
and identical distributions to the Shannon entropy [33, 45]
and given by λIID = −1/2 log c(δ)−O(m2
√
m/n) (see Ap-
pendix A51).
The three bounds are shown in Fig. 2. We see that for large
n, λGauss and λ

IID are approximately equal. In fact, in the limit
n → ∞ we find that both converge to the optimal bound de-
termined by the Shannon entropy −1/2 log c(δ). We further
plotted the EC rate for the OT protocol since a necessary con-
dition for security is that λ(n) has to be larger. We assume
an EPR state with variance V = 3~ (about 10.8dB) and trans-
mission losses on Bob’s mode of 0.05, an error-correction ef-
ficiency of 0.95 and excess noise 0.0005~. We see that λMaj
does not provide a very tight bound on the entropy rate such
that security can only be achieved under very restrictive as-
sumptions on the quantum memory of a malicious Bob.
V. SECURITY FOR REALISTIC MEMORY DEVICES
To obtain explicit parameters from (1), the second ingredi-
ent is a strong converse for the memory in question. Here, we
consider the security conditions for OT (4) and BC (5) for a
specific class of memory channels, namely, bosonic thermal-
loss channels with additive Gaussian noise. The question
of the classical capacity of such channels has only recently
been completely solved after settling the minimal output en-
tropy conjecture [46, 47]. Moreover, the exponential decay
of successful transmittance above the classical capacity has
been established for ξ = 1 under a maximal photon constraint
Nmax [48], i.e., every code word has (up to negligible prob-
ability) maximal Nmax photons. In Fig. 3, we show when
equality in the condition for OT (4) is attained under Gaussian
restriction of a malicious Bob’s encoding map E (i.e., λGauss)
depending on the transmissivity η and the additive noise vari-
ance N and different fractions of quantum memories ν. Since
there is only a week dependence for low thermal noise vari-
ance Vth ≤ 0.1, we set it equal to 0. We see that for ν ≤ 1/8
security can already been obtained for memory channels with
small losses and additive noise. Note that since ξ = 1 and
that log VC is approximately `EC (see Fig. 2), the same result
holds for the BC protocol. The approximately same curves are
obtained if one restricts the memory attacks to independent
and identical encodings over m ≤ 10 signals, i.e., exchanging
λGauss by λ

IID in (4). Moreover, security without any restric-
tion on the encoding (i.e., λMaj) can be obtained if the fraction
of the quantum memory is about ν ≈ 5 · 10−3. We finally
note that independent of the memory model, security for OT
and BC can only be obtained with squeezed states and if the
transmissivity between Alice and Bob is larger than 1/2.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a protocol for OT and BC using optical
CV systems that provide security in the noisy-storage model.
The protocol is practical and uses similar resources as CV
QKD. As a key ingredient, we analyze and derive uncertainty
relations for CV systems, that can be used along similar lines
to analyze the security in the noisy-storage model for other
two-party protocols such as secure password-based identifi-
cation [16, 22, 23]. We leave as open problem the task of
finding optimal uncertainty relations without any further as-
sumptions. It is possible that such relations can be obtained by
linking security again to the quantum capacity of the storage
device [17, 19], requiring however more sophisticated tech-
niques. Such a result would also pose a challenge to find an
explicit strong converse for the quantum capacity of bosonic
channels.
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Appendix A: CV uncertainty relations for the smooth
min-entropy
1. Smooth min-entropy
Let us consider a classical random variable Z with values
in a discrete but possibly infinite set Z that is correlated to a
quantum system B modeled by a Hilbert space HB . If Z is
distributed according to pz , the situation can be conveniently
be described by the state
ρZB =
∑
z
pz|z〉〈z| ⊗ ρzB , (A1)
where ρzB is the state of system B conditioned on z ∈ Z and
|z〉 an orthonormal basis. The conditional min-entropy of Z
6given B is then defined [34] as minus the logarithm of the
maximal success probability to correctly infer Z given access
to B, that is,
Hmin(Z|B)ρ = − log
(
sup
{Ez}
∑
z
pz tr(Ezρ
z
B)
)
, (A2)
with the supremum taken over all positive operator valued
measures (POVM) {Ez}, i.e., Ez ≥ 0 and
∑
z Ez = 1I. If
system B is a classical random variable Y jointly distributed
according to p(z, y), the min-entropy is defined for the state
ρZY =
∑
z,y p(z, y)|z〉〈z| ⊗ |y〉〈y| with |y〉 an orthonormal
basis.
The smooth min-entropy is then defined as the maximiza-
tion of the min-entropy over states that are -close in the puri-
fied distance P(ρ, σ) = √1− F (ρ, σ) [49]. Here F (ρ, σ) =
(tr |√ρ√σ|)2 denotes the fidelity. In formulas, this means
that
Hmin(Z|B)ρ = sup
ρ˜ZB
Hmin(Z|B)ρ˜ , (A3)
where P(ρZB , ρ˜ZB) ≤ .
The smooth min-entropy satisfies many entopy-like proper-
ties. For instance, we will frequently use the following chain
rule
Hmin(A|BZ) ≥ Hmin(A|B)− log |Z| , (A4)
where A,B are arbitrary systems (quantum or classical) and
Z a classical system of dimension |Z|. For further properties
of the smooth min-entropy, we refer the reader to [50] in the
finite-dimensional and to [45, 51] in the infinite-dimensional
case.
Reduction to R’enyi Entropy. We are interested in lower
bounding the smooth min-entropy
1
n
Hmin(Z|θK) ≥ λ (A5)
in which the side-information K is classical as well. Note
that we omit the subscriptA in Alice’s measurement choice θ.
Because of the maximization in the definition of the smooth
min-entropy (A3), it is very difficult to bound the smooth min-
entropy directly. Instead, it is easier to use that it can be related
to the conditional α-Rényi entropies
Hα(A|B)ρ = 1
1− α log tr[ρ
α
AB(idA ⊗ ρB)1−α] . (A6)
In particular, it holds for α ∈ (1, 2] and any two random vari-
ables X and Y that [52]
Hmin(X|Y ) ≥ Hα(X|Y )−
1
α− 1 log
2
2
, (A7)
We present in Lemma F.1 a simple generalization of the result
to unbounded classical variables X and Y . Hence, if we find
a bound on the Rényi-entropies
1
n
Hα(Z|θK) ≥ Bα (A8)
we obtain a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy with
λ = sup
1<α≤2
(
Bα − 1
n(α− 1) log
2
2
)
. (A9)
Moreover, as shown in [41], it suffices to find a bound
Hα(Z|θ) ≥ Bα for n = 1 and without K, as such a bound
implies that Hα(X|θK) ≥ nλ for strings X and Θ of any
length n. This implication basically follows from the fact that
the conditional Rényi entropies can be expanded as
2(1−α)Hα(Z|Y ) =
∑
y
2(1−α)Hα(X|Y=y) , (A10)
whereHα(X|Y = y) denotes the α-Rényi entropy ofX given
Y = y.
2. Uncertainty relation for Rényi entropy
a. Preliminaries
According to the discussion in the previous section it is suf-
ficient to consider the case of n = 1 and trivialK. That is, the
system A is a position-momentum system and θ ∈ {0, 1} is a
uniformly distributed random variable indicating the measure-
ment choice, i.e., θ = 0 and θ = 1 corresponding to Xδx and
Pδp . For the sake of generality, we allow for different binning
δx and δp for the coarse-grained X and P measurement.
In the following we assume that {Ik}k∈N and {Jk}k∈N are
two partitions of R into intervals of constant length δx and δp,
respectively. We denote the probability to measure X (P ) in
interval Ik (Jl) by qk (pl). Using the definition of the Rényi
entropy together with the expansion in (A10), we find that
2(1−α)Hα(X|θ) =
1
2
(
∑
k
qαk +
∑
l
pαl ) . (A11)
Given that α > 1, an upper bound on the above sums results
in a lower bound on Hα(X|θ).
For simplicity, let us first consider the continuous case for
δx, δp → 0. In this case, the sums in (A11) become integrals
and we obtain
2(1−α)hα(X|θ) =
1
2
(∫
q(x)αdx+
∫
p(x)αdx
)
, (A12)
where q and p are the probability distributions corresponding
to X and P , and hα(X|θ) denotes the differential conditional
Rényi entropy. While q, p are integrable functions, that is not
necessarily true for qα, pα. Hence, it is possible that (A12)
diverges when optimizing over all possible states. So, no un-
certainty relation can be shown for continuous measurements.
The right hand side of (A12) can be made arbitrarily large
even for Gaussian states. For a normal distribution with stan-
dard deviation σ, the differential α-Rényi entropy is
hα(X) = log
[√
2piσα
1
2(α−1)
]
. (A13)
7Hence, we obtain for a Gaussian state with standard deviation
σX and σP in X and P that
2(1−α)hα(X|θ)ρ = (2pi)(1−α)/2α−1/2
(
1
σα−1Q
+
1
σα−1P
)
.
(A14)
This quantity can be made arbitrarily large by taking a suffi-
ciently small standard deviation for either σQ or σP . How-
ever, the divergence is not a problem for coarse-grained out-
comes as both of the sums in (A11) are upper bounded by 1.
In order to bound (A11), we have to use that not all possi-
ble distributions qk and pl are possible since they origin from
measurements of the complementary observables X and P
that are related via Fourier transform. This relation has been
made rigorous by Landau and Pollak [44] (see also [53, Sec-
tion 2.9]), who show that the probability q[I] to measure X in
an interval I (a = |I|) and the probability p[J ] to measure P
in an interval J (b = |J |) have to satisfy the inequality
cos−1
√
q[I] + cos−1
√
p[J ] ≥ cos−1
√
γ(a, b) (A15)
where
γ(a, b) :=
ab
2pi~
S
(1)
0
(
1,
ab
4~
)2
(A16)
with S(1)0 the 0th radial prolate spheroidal wave function of
the first kind. For ab sufficiently small γ(a, b) ≈ ab/(2pi~).
The condition (A15) can be reformulated in the following
way [53]:
i) If 0 ≤ q[I] ≤ γ(a, b), then all values for p[J ] are possi-
ble, and
ii) if γ(a, b) ≤ q[I], then p[J ] ≤ g(q[I], a, b) for
g(q, a, b) :=
(√
qγ(a, b) +
√
(1− q)(1− γ(a, b))
)2
.
(A17)
This reformulation yields an infinite number of constraints
for the probability distributions. Let us assume that {qk}k and
{pl}l are decreasingly ordered. Then for allM,N ∈ N, {qk}k
and {pl}l have to satisfy the constraints
N∑
j=1
pkj ≤ g
(
M∑
i=1
qi,Mδx, Nδp
)
. (A18)
However, it is non-trivial to turn these constraints into an ex-
plicit and tight upper bound for (A11). In the following we
discuss a particular way that connects the above constraints
with a majorization approach, which leads to λMaj.
b. Majorization uncertainty relation
This bound follows from an idea in [27]. Let us denote by r
the decreasingly ordered sequence of both probabilities {qk}
and {pl}. Then, the expression (A11) can be written as
2(1−α)Hα(X|θ) =
1
2
∑
j
rαj . (A19)
Since the function r 7→ ∑j rαj is Schur convex, we get an
upper bound on (A11) if we find a sequence w which ma-
jorizes any physically possible sequence r. Such a w can be
constructed in the following way [27].
First note that according to property ii) , q[I]+p[J ] ≤ q[I]+
g(q[I], a, b), which optimized over all 0 ≤ q[I] ≤ 1 is equal
to 1 +
√
γ(a, b). Hence, we obtain the constraint
q[I] + p[J ] ≤ 1 +
√
γ(a, b) . (A20)
This constraint implies further that
n∑
j=1
rj ≤ 1 + Fn(δq, δp) , (A21)
where
Fn(δx, δp) = max
1≤k≤n
√
c (kδx, (n− k)δp) . (A22)
Note that in the case δx = δp the maximum is attained for
k = bn2 c.
We can construct a majorizing sequence w by setting recur-
sively
w1 = 1, and wk = Fk − wk−1 for k ≥ 2 . (A23)
The obtained bound on the Rényi-entropy is
Hα(X|θ) ≥ BαMaj (A24)
where
BαMaj =
1
1− α log
(
1
2
∑
k
wαk
)
. (A25)
By using (A9), we obtain the following bound on the smooth
min-entropy
λMaj := sup
1<α≤2
(
BαMaj −
1
n(α− 1) log
2
2
)
. (A26)
Since BαMaj depends on the recursively defined sequence w
in (A23), there is no closed form and it can only be computed
numerically. However, one can easily check that Bα is mono-
tonically increasing in α, which simplifies the optimization
over α required for the calculation of λMaj.
c. Uncertainty relation for Gaussian states
In order to obtain a tighter bound, we consider an uncer-
tainty relation that holds for arbitrary Gaussian states or any
mixture thereof. In fact, for our application it is important
to allow arbitrary and even continuous mixtures of Gaussian
8states. The reason is that a coarse-grained quadrature mea-
surement with finite binning on one mode of a multi-mode
Gaussian state results in a continuous mixture of Gaussian
states in the remaining modes (and not in a Gaussian state
itself). Since conditioning on part of the measurement out-
comes on Alice’s mode is needed to generalize the uncertainty
relation from n = 1 to n > 1 [41], this level of generality is
crucial.
Theorem A.1. Let α ∈ (1, 2]. For an arbitrary and pos-
sibly continuous convex combination of Gaussian states and
coarse-grained measurements Xδx and Pδp holds that
Hα(Z|θ) ≥ BαGauss(δ) , (A27)
where
BαGauss(δx, δp) =
1
1− α log
1
2
(
1 +
1
α
(
δxδx
pi~
)(α−1))
(A28)
Proof. We first assume that the state is a Gaussian state. Let us
recall that we have to upper bound the sums in (A11). Denot-
ing the probability density function of the continuous X mea-
surement by q(x), a simple application of Jensen’s inequality
results in
qαk =
(∫
Ik
q(x)dx
)α
≤ δα−1x
∫
Ik
q(x)αdx . (A29)
Hence, using the formula for the Rényi entropy of a Gaussian
state (A13), we find for a state with standard deviation σX for
the X measurement that∑
k
qαk ≤ δα−1
∫
q(x)αdx = g(σ˜X) , (A30)
where σ˜X = σX/δX is the relative standard deviation and
g(x) =
1√
α(
√
2pix)α−1
. (A31)
Note that the bound g(σ˜X) becomes very bad if σ˜X is very
small. In particular, it can exceed the trivial upper bound on∑
k q
α
k given by 1. We avoid that problem by simply bounding∑
k
qαk ≤ min{g(σ˜X), 1} . (A32)
Let us use that the standard deviations of the X and P dis-
tribution satisfy σXσP ≥ ~/2, which translates into σ˜X σ˜P ≥
~/(2δxδp) for the relative standard deviations. For the follow-
ing it is convenient to define ~˜ := ~/(δxδp). Given that we
want to maximize the quantity over all Gaussian states, we can
without loss of generality assume that σ˜X ≥ ~˜/
√
2 and that
σ˜P = ~˜/(2σ˜X) ≤ σ˜X . A straightforward calculation then
results in∑
k
qαk +
∑
k
pαk ≤ min{g(σ˜X), 1}+ min{g(σ˜P ), 1}
≤
{
g(σ˜X) + g(σ˜P ) if σ˜X ≤ ~˜
√
pi
2α
1
2(α−1) ,
1 + g(σ˜X) otherwise.
One can check easily that g(σ˜X) + g(~˜/(2σ˜X)) is monoton-
ically increasing in σ˜X , and 1 + g(σ˜X) is monotonically de-
creasing in σ˜X . Hence, the maximum of the right hand side is
attained exactly for σ˜X = ~˜
√
pi
2α
1
2(α−1) . Plugging this value
in, we obtain that
∑
k
qαk +
∑
k
pαk ≤ 1 +
1
α
(
1
pi
)α−1(
(δxδp)
~
)(α−1)
,
(A33)
which finishes the proof for Gaussian states.
Let us now assume that the state is given by ρ =∫
Y
dµ(y)p(y)ρy with (Y, dµ) a sigma-finite measure space,
p a probability distribution over Y and ρy a Gaussian state for
any y. It then follows that theX measurement maps ρ to an el-
ement of L1(R) that can be written as ρQ =
∫
Y
dµ(y)p(y)ρyQ
with ρyQ the Gaussian distribution of the position of ρ
y . The
same holds for the P measurement. It thus follows that∑
k
(∫
Ik
dx
∫
Y
dµ(y)p(y)ρyQ(x)
)α
(A34)
=
∑
k
(∫
Y
dµ(y)p(y)
∫
Ik
dxρyQ(x)
)α
(A35)
≤
∑
k
∫
Y
dµ(y)p(y)
(∫
Ik
dxρyQ(x)
)α
(A36)
=
∫
Y
dµ(y)p(y)
∑
k
(∫
Ik
dxρyQ(x)
)α
, (A37)
where the two equalities follow from Fubini’s theorem (since
all integrals and sums are bounded) and the inequality from
the convexity of the function x 7→ xα on the non-negative
reals (for α ∈ (1, 2]). Thus, by the linearity of the integral we
obtain the desired result.
Similar to the majorization uncertainty relation, we get a
bound on the smooth min-entropy via (A9)
1
n
Hmin(Z|θK) ≥ λGauss(δx, δp, n) , (A38)
with
λGauss(δx, δp, n) := sup
α
(
BαGauss(δx, δp)−
1
n(α− 1) log
2
2
)
.
(A39)
Let us show that the performance of the inequality in the
asymptotic limit is optimal in the sense that it converges to
the bound obtained for the Shannon entropy. In order to do
so, we consider the limit
lim
→0
lim
n→∞λ

Gauss(δx, δp, n) = lim
α→1
BαGauss(δx, δp) , (A40)
where we used that BαGauss(δx, δp) is independent of n and
monotonically decreasing in α. A straightforward calculation
yields that
lim
α→1
BαGauss(δx, δp) = −
1
2
log c(δx, δp) , (A41)
9where c(δx, δp) := δxδp/(pie~) is the uncertainty
bound for the Shannon entropy, i.e., H(X|θ) ≥
−(1/2) log c(δx, δp) [43].
Intuitively, the reason for this convergence is that we use
Jensen inequality (A29) to bound the discrete entropy to the
differential entropy, i.e., Hα(Xδ) ≥ hα(X) − log δ, together
with the fact that the uncertainty relation for differential Shan-
non entropies [54, 55] becomes an equality for any pure Gaus-
sian state. Hence, for the limit case α→ 1, we simply obtain
2H(Xδ|θ) = H(Qδ) +H(Pδ) (A42)
≥ h(Q) + h(P )− log δ2 (A43)
≥ − log pie~− log δ2 (A44)
= − log c(δ) , (A45)
where we used δQ = δP = δ for simplicity.
3. Uncertainty relation under iid assumption
The following bound is based on the property that the
smooth min-entropy of n independent and identically dis-
tributed (iid) random variables converges to the Shannon en-
tropy in the asymptotic limit [33]. We use a result derived
in [52], which for iid random variables Xn and Y n reads as
1
n
Hmin(X
n|Y n) ≥ H(X|Y )− 4√
n
log(η(X)ρ)
2
√
log
2
2
(A46)
where η(X) = 2 + 2H1/2(X)ρ/2. The above result holds
also for random variables over infinite alphabets if H(X) <
∞ [45]. The crucial point for the application of the inequal-
ity in (A46) is that the correction term beside the Shannon
entropy is independent of the conditioning variable Y .
Let us assume that Bob produces an ensemble of n-mode
states according to an independent and identical distribution
(iid) over only m modes such that the state on A and K has
the form ρAnKn = (σAmKm)⊗n/m, where we assume that
n/m ∈ N. Then, also the random variable Zn obtained by
measuring randomly eitherXδx or Pδp has the same structure.
Applying the inequality (A46), we obtain that
1
n
Hmin(Z
n|θnKn) ≥ 1
m
H(Zm|θmKm) (A47)
− 4
√
m
n
log(η(Zm))2
√
log
2
2
.
(A48)
At this point, we can simply use the uncertainty relation for
the Shannon entropy [43]
H(Zm|KmΘ = θ) +H(Zm|KΘ = θ¯) ≥ −m log c(δx, δp) ,
(A49)
where θ¯ = (1 − θi)mi=1 denotes the complementary basis
choice of θ = (θi)mi=1. This inequality implies that
H(Zm|ΘK)
=
1
2m
∑
θ
1
2
(
H(Zm|KΘ = θ) +H(Zm|KΘ = θ¯))
≥− m
2
log c(δx.δp) .
Hence, we obtain the uncertainty relation
1
n
Hmin(Z
n|θnKn) ≥ λIID(δ,m, n) , (A50)
where
λIID(δ,m, n) = −
1
2
log c(δx, δp) (A51)
− 4
√
m
n
log(η(Zm))2
√
log
2
2
. (A52)
Note that even though the right-hand side still depends on the
distribution of Zm, it is not conditioned on K and Alice can
estimate it. Particularly, in the application to oblivious transfer
or bit commitment, we can assume that Alice distributes the
average ensemble state, and thus, knows the distribution over
Z by herself. Note further that log(η(Zm)) = O(m) such
that
λIID(δ,m, n) = −
1
2
log c(δx, δp)−O(m2
√
m
n
) . (A53)
Similarly to when we restricted to Gaussian states, we
find that in the asymptotic limit, the bound converges to
−1/2 log c(δx, δp).
Appendix B: Oblivious Transfer
1. Composable security definitions
In the following, we denote random variables by capital let-
ters, e.g, S0, S1 for Alice’s output. The uniform distribution
of a random variable X is denoted by τX and the classically
maximally correlated state of two random variables X and Y
with same range by ΩXY , i.e., ΩX = τX , ΩY = τY , and
ΩX|Y=y = δx,y . Moreover, we set [n] = {1, 2, ..., n} and
x¯ = 1− x for any binary variable x.
We use the composable security definitions from [16].
Definition B.1. A protocol between two parties Alice and Bob
that takes input T in {0, 1} from Bob and outputs on Alice’s
side two bit strings S0, S1 in {0, 1}` and on Bob’s side S˜ in
{0, 1}` is called an (C , A, B)-secure (sender-randomized)
OT` protocol if the following conditions hold:
• The protocol is C-correct. That is, if both parties
follow the protocol, then the output of the protocol
ρS0S1S˜T satisfies for t ∈ {0, 1}
‖ρS0S1S˜|T=t − τSt¯ ⊗ ΩStS˜‖1 ≤ C . (B1)
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• The protocol is A-secure for Alice. That is, if Alice
follows the protocol, then for any strategy of Bob with
output ρS0S1B′ , where B
′ denotes Bob’s register at the
end of the protocol, there exists a random variable D
with range {0, 1} such that
‖ρSD¯SDDB′ − τSD¯ ⊗ ρSDDB′‖1 ≤ A . (B2)
• The protocol is B-secure for Bob. That is, if Bob
follows the protocol, then for any strategy of Alice
with output A′, resulting in the joint output state
ρA′S˜T , there exist random variables S
′
0, S
′
1 such that
ρA′S′0S′1S˜T
satisfies Pr[S˜ 6= S′T ] ≤ B and
‖ρA′S′0S′1|T=0 − ρA′S′0S′1|T=1‖1 ≤ B . (B3)
2. Security analysis for oblivious transfer
The conditions for correctness are that S˜ is with high prob-
ability equal to St and that S0S1 are uniformly distributed.
The first condition relies on the error-correction protocol. We
assume in the following that the procedure manages to correct
the error with probability EC. The second condition follows
from the security definition for Alice (B2) by using the mono-
tonicity of the trace norm. Hence, if security for Alice holds
with A, correctness holds with at least C = EC + 2A.
Security for Bob holds since he only sends the sets I0, I1
during the entire protocol, which due to the random choice of
the measurement by Bob are independent of t. This has been
made precise in [14].
Let us consider security for Alice. Recall that Bob’s mem-
ory attack is given by an encoding E mapping the n modes
to systems Qin and K, where Qin is the input of his memory
channelM = F⊗νn and K some additional classical infor-
mation. Hence, after completing the entire protocol, Bob’s
system is given by B′ = QoutBcl, where Qout = M(Qin)
and Bcl = θAKWHC all his classical information. Here,
W = (W0,W1) denotes the error-correction information, and
H = (F0, F1) the 2-universal hash functions used for privacy
amplification.
According to (B2), we have to show that there exists a ran-
dom variable D such that
‖ρSDSD¯DQoutBcl − τSD ⊗ ρSD¯DQoutBcl‖1 ≤ A. (B4)
The privacy amplification lemma [33, 56] against infinite-
dimensional quantum adversaries [51] tells us that (B4) is sat-
isfied for
` ≥ H1min(ZD|SD¯DQoutBcl)− 2 log
1
A − 41 , (B5)
with 1 ≥ 0 arbitrary such that A ≥ 41.
Hence, it remains to find a tight lower bound on the
smooth min-entropy H1min(ZD|SD¯DQoutBcl). For this pur-
pose we follow similar arguments as in [16, 23]. Therein,
a central ingredient is a bound of the smooth min-entropy
Hmin(U |M(Qin)V ) with U, V classical and M a quantum
channel by the success probability to send classical informa-
tion at a rate R throughM
PMsucc(nR) := sup
ρk,Dk
1
2nR
∑
k
tr(DkM(ρk)) , (B6)
where the supremum runs over ensembles of code states
(ρk)
nR
k=1 and POVM’s (Dk)
nR
k=1 acting as a decoder. It has
been shown in [16] that (see also Lemma F.2)
H+
′
min (U |M(Qin)V ) ≥ − logPMsucc
(
bHmin(U |V )ρ − log
1
′2
c
)
.
(B7)
Applying the chain rule (A4), we first bound
H1min(ZD|SD¯DQoutBcl) ≥ H1min(ZD|DQoutBcl)− ` ,
where we used that log |SD¯| = `. The smooth min-entropy
H1min(ZD|DQoutBcl) on the right hand side can then be lower
bounded by means of inequality (B5) by
− log
(
PMsucc
(
bH2min(ZD|DBcl)− log
1
(1 − 2)2 c
))
.
Plugging the bounds in (B5) and solving for `, one easily finds
that (B4) is satisfied if we choose ` smaller or equal to
− 1
2
log
(
PMsucc
(
bH2min(ZD|DBcl)− log
1
(1 − 2)2 c
))
− log 1
A − 41 .
The goal of the next part is to lower bound the smooth
min-entropy H2min(ZD|DBcl). For that lower bound, we use
the min-entropy splitting theorem [14], (see also Lemma F.3),
which tells us that there exists a random variable D such that
Hmin(ZD|DBcl) ≥
1
2
Hmin(Z0Z1|Bcl)− 1 . (B8)
Given that Bob’s classical registerBcl is given by θAKWHC,
we finally get via (A4) that
Hmin(Z0Z1|Bcl) ≥ Hmin(Z0Z1|θAK)− log |W | − log |C|
≥ Hmin(Z0Z1|θAK)− `EC − 2 log
1
C
,
where `EC = log |W |, and we used that the hash functions are
drawn independently at random.
Concluding the above discussion, we arrive at the follow-
ing bound on the length of the string that enables security for
Alice.
Theorem B.2. Let us assume that Hmin(Z|Kθ) ≥ nλ(n)
and Bob’s memory channel is given byM. Then the protocol
for OT consisting of steps (Q1)-(Q3) followed by (OT1)-(OT3)
is A-secure for Alice if
` = −1
2
logPMsucc (bnrOTc)− log
1
A − 41 , (B9)
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where
rOT := λ2(n)− rEC −
1
n
(
2 log
1
C
− log 1
(1 − 2)2 − 1
)
(B10)
and 1, 2 ≥ 0 arbitrary such that A > 41 > 42.
Note that when the right-hand side of (B9) is negative, a
secure implementation of the OT protocol is not possible.
Let us consider the case where Bob’s quantum channel F
is such that the success probability to send classical bits above
the classical capacity Ccl(F) decreases exponentially
PF⊗nsucc (nR) ≤ 2−nξ(R−Ccl(F)) . (B11)
This property is generally referred to as strong converse for
the classical capacity. Note that for channels F for which it
is only known that property (B11) is satisfied for a rate Csc >
Ccl(F) usually referred to as a strong converse capacity of F ,
the following discussion holds similarly with Ccl(F) replaced
by Csc.
A simple calculation shows that if Bob’s memory is of the
formM = F⊗νn and (B11) holds, then the condition
‘rOT > νCcl(F) (B12)
is sufficient to obtain security for a large enough n. Moreover
the length of the strings s0, s1 can be chosen as
` = nξ(rOT − Ccl(F)) . (B13)
A necessary condition for security is thus
1/2(λ − rEC) > 0 . (B14)
Let us analyse the above condition in the asymptotic limit.
We know according to (A41) and (A53) that λGauss and λ

IID
converge to −1/2 log c(δ), where we assume in the follow-
ing for simplicity that δx = δp = δ. Using the exponential
deFinetti theorem or the post-selection technique applied to
CV protocols [57, 58], it is easy to convince oneself that this
bound holds in the asymptotic limit without any assumptions
(e.g., Gauss or iid). This insight yields the asymptotic formula
λas(δ) := −1/2 log c(δ).
The error-correction rate in the asymptotic scenario is given
according to the Slepian-Wolf theorem [59] as the conditional
Shannon entropy H(XAδ |XBδ ), where XAδ (XBδ ) is the out-
come of Alice’s (Bob’s) coarse-grained X measurement. We
assume here that the state is symmetric with respect to X and
P . This assumption is reasonable because if both parties are
honest, the state is an EPR state with one-sided loss. Let us de-
note the conditional variance of XA given XB by VA|B [60].
Then, if δ  VA|B , we find with good approximation that
rEC = H(X
A
δ |XBδ ) ≈ h(XA|XB)−log δ, where h(XA|XB)
is the conditional differential Shannon entropy of XA given
XB . Hence, we obtain
λas − rEC ≈ log
√
epi − h(XA|XB)
= log
√
epi~− log
(√
2pieVA|B
)
= log
(√
~
2VA|B
)
.
In order to satisfy (B14), we need that VA|B <
√
~/2.
Given a Gaussian state with covariance matrix as in (D1) (that
is, an EPR state with one-sided losses 1 − τ and ξ = 0), the
condition above reads as (~ = 2)
VA|B =
(1− τ)V + τ
(1− τ) + τV < 1 . (B15)
Since V ≥ 1, the condition can only be satisfied if the trans-
missivity τ > 1/2 and for a non-trivial squeezing V > 1.
Appendix C: Bit commitment
1. Security definitions
Let us first introduce the notation. In the bit commit-
ment phase, Bob inputs a bit C to which he commits. In
the open phase Alice outputs a bit C˜ and a flag F , where
F ∈ {accept, reject} depending whether Alice accepts or re-
jects the commitment.
We use composable security definitions adapted from [16].
Definition C.1. A protocol between two parties Alice and Bob
that consists of a commitment phase where Bob commits to
a bit C and an open phase in which Alice outputs C˜ and a
flag F ∈ {accept, reject} is called an (C , H , B)-secure bit
commitment protocol if the following conditions hold:
• The protocol is C-correct. That is, if both parties are
honest, then it holds that Pr[ C˜ 6= C | F = accept ] ≤
C and Pr[F = reject] ≤ C .
• The protocol is H -hiding. That is, if Bob is honest then
for any strategy of Alice with joint output state ρA′C , it
holds after the commitment phase that
‖ρA′|C=0 − ρA′|C=1‖1 ≤ H . (C1)
• The protocol is B-binding. That is, if Alice is honest,
then for any strategy of Bob, there exists after the com-
mitment phase a random variable D in {0, 1} such that
for any value D′ that Bob wants to convince Alice to
accept, it holds that
Pr[D′ 6= D |F = accept ] ≤ B . (C2)
2. Security analysis for bit commitment
It is easy to see that the BC protocol is correct. The first
condition Pr[ C˜ 6= C | F = accept ] ≤ C is satisfied due to
the definition of the protocol. The second condition holds for
sufficiently large n due to the properties of typical sets. The
protocol is perfectly hiding as Bob does not send any informa-
tion to Alice during the commitment phase. So, the interesting
case is to show that the protocol is binding as long as Bob’s
quantum memory satisfies some constraints. We start with a
lemma.
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Lemma C.2. Let ρXU be an arbitrary state on X and U ,
where X is a classical system with alphabet X and U is arbi-
trary (possibly quantum). Moreover, letB(x) ⊂ X for x ∈ X .
Then for all  ≥ 0, the optimal probability to correctly guess
Y in B(X) given the system U is upper bounded by
sup
E
Pρ[E(U) ∈ B(X)] ≤ max
y
|B−1(y)|2−Hmin(X|U) + 2,
(C3)
whereB−1(y) = {x | y ∈ B(x)} and the supremum runs over
all channels E that map U to X .
Proof. We consider first the case  = 0. Let Y = E(U) for an
arbitrary channel E with range X , and p(x, y) the correspond-
ing joint distribution of X and Y . We then compute
Pρ[Y ∈ B(X)]
=
∑
x,y
δ(y ∈ B(x))p(x, y)
=
∑
y
p(y)
∑
x
δ(y ∈ B(x))p(x|y)
≤
∑
y
p(y) max
x′
p(x′|y) max
y′
∑
x
δ(y′ ∈ B(x))
= max
y′
|B−1(y′)|
∑
y
p(y)2−Hmin(X|Y=y)
= max
y
|B−1(y)|2−Hmin(X|Y )ρ
≤ max
y
|B−1(y)|2−Hmin(X|U)ρ .
In the third equality, we used that the min-entropy of a dis-
tribution q(x) is − log maxx q(x), the forth equality uses a
basic property of the classical conditional min-entropy, and
the last inequality is due to the data-processing inequality
Hmin(X|U) ≤ Hmin(X|E(U)) (see e.g. [50]). Since the up-
per bound holds for any E and is independent of E , we can
also take the supremum over all E concluding the result for
 = 0.
In order to generalize the above estimate to  > 0, we take
an arbitrary state ρ˜XU such that P(ρXU , ρ˜XU ) ≤ . We de-
note the joint probability distribution obtained by applying an
arbitrary strategy E on ρXU and ρ˜XU by p(x, y) and p˜(x, y),
respectively. We then compute that
Pρ[Y ∈ B(X)] =
∑
x,y
δ(y ∈ B(x))p(x, y)
=
∑
x,y
δ(y ∈ B(x))p˜(x, y)
+
∑
x,y
δ(y ∈ B(x)) (p(x, y)− p˜(x, y))
≤ max
y
|B−1(y)|2−Hmin(X|U)ρ˜
+ ‖ρXY − ρ˜XY ‖1 ,
where the last inequality follows from the result for  = 0
applied to ρ˜XU , and ρXY = E(ρXU ) and similar for ρ˜XY .
Due to the monotonicity of the trace norm under channels, we
have that ‖ρXY −ρ˜XY ‖1 ≤ ‖ρXU−ρ˜XU‖1. Finally, by using
that for any two states σ and η, the purified distance satisfies
‖σ − η‖1 ≤ 2P(σ, η), and by taking the minimum over all
states ρ˜XU with P(ρXU , ρ˜XU ) ≤ , we arrive at the desired
inequality.
In the following, additional to (Q1)-(Q3) and (BC1), we
assume that Alice sets F=reject also if the condition n/2−ε′ ≤
|I| ≤ n/2 + ε′ is violated. Moreover, we define a general
verification setBmC (ZI), wherem = |ZI | indicates the length
of the string and C the probability that YI is in BmC (ZI). We
discuss the proper choice of the verification set BmC (ZI) as
the set of typical subsequences after the proof of the following
theorem.
Theorem C.3. Let us assume that Hmin(Z|Kθ) ≥ nλ(n)
and Bob’s memory channel is given byM. Then, the BC pro-
tocol with verification set BmC (z), z ∈ Xm, is B-binding
with
B ≤ V ε′CPMsucc
(
bn
2
λ1(n)− log
1
(2 − 1)2 − 1c
)
+ 22
(C4)
where V ε
′
C := maxy |[Bn/2+ε
′
C ]
−1(y)| and B/2 > 2 > 1 ≥
0 arbitrary.
Proof. We use the same notation as in the proof for OT and
denote Bob’s system after the commitment phase by B′ =
QoutK where K is a classical register and Qout = M(Qin).
Let us denote by Z0 and Z1 the substrings of Z in which Alice
chose basis 0 and 1, respectively. According to (C2), we have
to show that there exists a random variable D such that the
probability that Bob convinces Alice that his commitment was
D¯ is smaller than B . Let us denote Bob’s system after the
commitment phase by B′ and his opening strategy by E from
B′ to Z . Since Alice accepts only if Bob can answer correctly
with a string Y = E(B′) in BC (ZD¯), the probability can be
bounded by Lemma C.2 as
P[E(B′) ∈ BC (XD¯)|F = accept] ≤ V ε
′
C2
−Hmin(XD¯|B′D)
+ 2 ,
where we used that V ε
′
C ≥ maxy |[B|ZD|C ]−1(y)|. Hence, it
remains to find a lower bound on Hmin(ZD¯|B′D). For that
we follow a similar strategy as in the proof of OT.
In order to define the random variable D, we use the min-
entropy splitting theorem (Lemma F.3). This lemma tells us
that there exists a random variable D such that
Hmin(ZD¯|DKθA) ≥
1
2
Hmin(Z0Z1|KθA)− 1 . (C5)
This technique allows us to define a state ρZDKQoutD such that
ρZDKQout(D=d) = ρZdKQout . We then bound the smooth min-
entropy of this state by using (B7) (see also Lemma F.2)
Hmin(ZD¯|KM(Qin)θAD)
≥ − log
(
PMsucc
(
bH1min(ZD¯|KθAD)− log
1
(− 1)2 c
))
,
which concludes the proof by setting  = 2.
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Let us assume that the memory channel satisfies a strong
converse similar to (B11) given by
PF⊗νnsucc (nR) ≤ 2−nξ(R−νC(F)) . (C6)
According to Theorem C.3, we obtain an B-binding protocol
if B − 22 is smaller than
2
−n
[
(ξ/2)(λ1 (n)−(1/n) log 1(1−2)2−1/n)−log V
ε′
ε /n−C(F)
]
.
Hence, the necessary condition for obtaining security for suf-
ficiently large n is given by
ξ
2
λ1(n)(δx)−
log V ε
′
ε
n
− νC(F) (C7)
− 1
n
(log
1
(B − 22)(1 − 2)2 + 1) > 0 , (C8)
where 1, 2 can be chosen arbitrarily according to B/2 >
2 > 1 ≥ 0.
The canonical choice for the verification set Bmε (z) is the
set of ε-typical sequences corresponding to the output on
Bob’s side if Alice’s outcome is z. Let us now assume that
the state shared by Alice and Bob is given by an EPR state
where Bob’s mode is sent through a fiber with transmissivity
τ . Thus, it is of form (D1). Then the outcomeXA of a contin-
uousX measurement on Alice’s side relates to Bob’s outcome
XB of an X measurement by
XB =
√
τXA +N (VB|A) , (C9)
where VB|A denotes the conditional variance ofXB givenXA
(which is independent ofXA for (D1)), andN (V ) denotes the
normal distribution centered at 0 with variance V . It follows
that 1/
√
τXB −XA is distributed according to N (VB|A/τ).
Hence, in the case of continuous measurements, the typical
set corresponds to the typical set of the normal distribution
N (VB|A/τ). Note that the state considered here is symmetric
in X and P .
Alice and Bob measure coarse-grained versions of XA
and XB . In order to re-scale Bob’s outcome directly, it is
convenient to choose different discretizations for Alice and
Bob given by δA = δ and δB =
√
τδ. Then Bob’s dis-
cretized outcome is distributed according to the discretiza-
tion of XA + N (VB|A/τ) with binning δ. Hence, the ver-
ification set is translation invariant and given by Bmε (z) =
z + Tmε (VB|A/τ, δ), where T
m
ε (VB|A/τ, δ) denotes the ε-
typical sequences of length m sampled according to the dis-
cretized normal distribution N (VB|A/τ) with binning δ.
We are interested in the inverse set [Bmε ]
−1(y), which
due to the appropriate scaling of Bob’s outcome is equal to
Bmε (z). Note that the size of the set of ε-typical sequences
of length m of a random variable W is upper bounded by
2n(H(W )+ε). Since the distribution of XB√
τδ
conditioned on
XAδ is independent of the value of X
A
δ , we have that the en-
tropy of the conditional distribution for a fixed value of XAδ
is equal to the average over all values of XAδ . This then im-
plies that log Tmε (VB|A/τ, δ) = n(H(X
B√
τδ
|XAδ )+ε), which
yields
V ε
′
ε = (
n
2
+ ε′)(H(XB√τδ|XAδ ) + ε) . (C10)
As in the case of OT, let us consider condition (C7) in the
asymptotic limit, i.e., taking λas(δ). For simplicity, we again
assume that
√
τδ  VA|B such that we can approximate
H(XB√
τδ
|XAδ ) ≈ h(XB |XA) − log
√
τδ. Then, we find that
in the asymptotic limit the condition for security is given by
ξλas(δ)−H(Y√τδ|Xδ) ≈ ξ log
√
epi − h(Y |X) + log τ
+ (ξ − 1) log 1
δ
.
The last term shows that the value of ξ is very crucial, in the
sense that if ξ > 1, we can increase the value arbitrarily by
making δ small. Unfortunately, in the case of bosonic chan-
nels ξ = 1. For ξ = 1 and a state given in (D1), the condition
ξλas(δ)−H(Y√τδ|Xδ) > 0 translates to (~ = 2)
(1− τ)V + τ
τV
< 1 (C11)
which is satisfied if τ > V/(2V − 1). Hence, a non-trivial
squeezing is required and τ > 1/2 in the limit V →∞.
Appendix D: Model of the EPR source
For the simulations used to generate Fig. 2 and 3, we as-
sume an EPR state with variance V = ~ cosh 2r with r the
squeezing parameter (see, e.g., [25]). Alice’s mode is loss-
free and Bob’s mode is sent through a fiber with transmissivity
τ . We further assume in some cases a non-zero excess noise
ξ. Then, the covariance matrix of the Gaussian state shared
between Alice and Bob is given by(
V I
√
τ(V 2 − 1)Z√
τ(V 2 − 1)Z VB(τ, ξ)I
)
(D1)
with I the identity in C2, Z = diag(1,−1) and VB(τ, ξ) =
τV + (1 − τ)~/2 + τξ. Since large distances are not partic-
ularly required for the usefulness of OT and BC, we assume
in the plots that τ = 0.94 and ξ = 0.0005~. Moreover, we
use a variance of V = 3~ which corresponds to a squeezing
strength of about 10.8dB.
Appendix E: Bosonic Gaussian memory channels
Let us consider the security conditions for the OT and BC
protocol if Bob’s memory channel (or a part of it) can be mod-
elled by a phase-insensitive Gaussian channel that acts on a
single-mode covariance matrix as
Γ 7→ TΓTT +N , (E1)
where T = diag(
√
t,
√
t) and N = diag(v, v) such that v ≥ 0
and v ≥ (t−1). In the following, we denote the corresponding
quantum channels by Ft,v .
14
For phase-insensitive Gaussian channels a strong converse
has recently been established [48, 61, 62]. Note first that the
classical capacities for bosonic channels are only bounded un-
der a mean-energy constraint, i.e., if the mean photon number
Nav of the average code state is finite. Then, the classical ca-
pacities are given by [46, 47]
C(Ft,v|Nav) = g (tNav + (t+ v − 1)/2)− g
(
t+ v − 1
2
)
,
(E2)
where g(x) = (x+ 1) log(x+ 1)− x log x.
For a strong converse bound to hold, a mean-photon num-
ber constraint is not sufficient and one has to impose a
maximal-photon-number constraint. More precisely, let ρn be
the average channel input for n channel uses of Et,v . Then we
say that a family of codes {ρn}n satisfies a maximal-photon-
number constraint (MPNC) with Nmax if [48]
tr (ΠnNmaxρ
n) ≥ 1− δ(n) (E3)
where ΠnNmax denotes the projector onto the subspace with
at most nNmax photons and δ(n) decays exponentially in n.
The strong converse theorem for any phase-insensitive
channel F from [62] then says that the success probability
for the transmission under the MPNC decays as
PF⊗nsucc (nR|Nmax) ≤ 2−n(R−C(F|Nmax)−δ1 + 2nδ2 + δ3(n) ,
(E4)
where δ1, δ2 are arbitrary small constants and δ3(n) =√
δ(n) +
√
δ(n) + δ4(n) with δ(n) given in (E3) and δ4(n)
is exponentially decreasing in n. Hence, we have a strong
converse of the form (B11) with ξ = 1, and we can analyse
the security conditions for OT and BC given in (4) and (5) in
the main text.
For the plots in the main text we consider the most com-
mon phase-insensitive channel given by a thermal-loss chan-
nel with additive noise. A thermal-loss channel can be mod-
eled by mixing the mode by a beam splitter with transmissiv-
ity η with a thermal state with average photon number Nth. In
terms of the parameters t, v in (E1), it is expressed by t = η
and v = (1 − η)(1 + 2Nth). Moreover, if we include addi-
tional additive Gaussian noise Vn, the parameters are t = η
and v = (1− η)(1 + 2Nth) + Vn.
Appendix F: Technical lemmas
Lemma F.1. Let X and Y be possibly infinite discrete classi-
cal systems. It then holds for any 1 < α ≤ 2 that
Hmin(X|Y ) ≥ Hα(X|Y )−
1
α− 1 log
2
2
. (F1)
Proof. The lemma has been shown for finite-dimensional
systems in [52]. An easy way to show it in the infinite-
dimensional case is by means of a finite-dimensional approx-
imation result shown in [45]. This approximation allows us to
obtain
Hmin(X|Y )ρ ≥ H−δmin (X|Y )PkρPk (F2)
≥ Hα(X|Y )PkρPk −
1
α− 1 log
2
(− δ)2
(F3)
where Pk = PXk ⊗PYk is a projector onto a finite-dimensional
subspace such that PkρPk is δ-close to ρ, for some δ > 0.
Note that such a projection always exists for any δ. Next, we
use that Hα(X|Y )PkρPk → Hα(X|Y )ρ for k → ∞. This
limit follows simply since all the sums involved in the defi-
nition of the α entropy converge absolutely, and thus, can be
rearranged. We get as conclusion that
Hmin(X|Y )ρ ≥ Hα(X|Y )ρ −
1
α− 1 log
2
(− δ)2 (F4)
holds for any δ > 0. And thus in the limit δ to 0 we obtain the
desired result.
The following statement has been shown in [16] and gener-
alizes straightforwardly to infinite dimensions using the same
strategy as in the proof above based on the approximation the-
orem in [45].
Lemma F.2. Let ρXKQin be a state of classical random vari-
ables XK correlated with a quantum system Qin and F a
quantum channel from Qin to Qout. Then, it holds that
H+
′
min (X|F(Qin)K) ≥ − logPsucc(k,′) , (F5)
where k,′ = bHmin(X|K)ρ − log 1/′2c.
The technique of min-entropy splitting is due to [35], and
used as the following Lemma in [14, 23], which generalizes
by a simple application of the approximation in [45] to arbi-
trary alphabet sizes.
Lemma F.3. Let X0, X1, Y be classical random variables.
Then there exists a random variable D with range {0, 1} such
that
Hmin(XD|DY ) ≥
1
2
Hmin(X0X1|Y )− 1 . (F6)
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